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The Power of Ancestors: Tombs and Death Practices in Late Qing China’s 
Foreign Relations, 1845–1914 
 
 
Shanghai was among the first five treaty ports to be opened to Europeans by the Treaty of 
Nanking, signed after the Qing Empire (1644–1911) was defeated by the British in the First 
Opium War (1839–1842).1 A wall poster from the early 1850s, currently in the collection of 
the Cambridge University Library, gives a rare glimpse of how people in Shanghai reacted to 
the arrival of foreign powers: 
 
To the households who have farmland or graves outside the North Gate of 
the City, on the Second and Third Land Registers: Our ancestors’ tombs and 
farmland are being confiscated by foreigners for road construction. The 
[area affected] is about ten square li, marked with concrete sticks.... 
Households victimised by the destruction, like mine, should take up 
weapons to chase out the [foreigners] and should not just sit by idly. After 
the tombs are destroyed, it will be too late for regret. From the first day of 
the second month, listen for the sound of gongs and then take action. This is 
to be widely advertised. After this poster is hung, in the spirit of solidarity, 
regardless of whether you are of Ningbo origins, Guangdong origins, or 
local resident, whoever helps the foreigners dig up farmland and graveyards 
for road building will be killed when the gongs sound.2 
                                                          
This work was supported by the British Economic and Social Research Council (RES-062-23-1057). A draft of 
this paper was presented at the conference ‘Treaty Ports in Modern China’ at the University of Bristol in July 
2011. My thanks to Chiara Betta, Annie Reinhardt, Aglaia de Angeli, Dorothée Rihal, Toby Lincoln, Shirley Ye 
and others who offered comments during the conference. Els Van Dongen, Robert Green, Benjamin Charlton 
Robert Bickers, Hallam Stevens, and Nicole Elizabeth Barnes read drafts of the paper and gave valuable 
comments. I am grateful for the suggestions of editors and readers of Past and Present that helped with the 
framing of the article, but responsibilities are mine alone. 
 
1 For the opening of treaty ports see John K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening 
of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969; first published 1953).  
2 The wall poster and a similar hand-copied poster belong to the uncatalogued Chinese collections of Cambridge 
University Library. They are also published in 王庆成Wang Qingcheng, 稀见清世史料并考释 Xijian qing shi 
shiliao bing kaoshi [Source Book of Rare Archival Documents of the Qing] (Wuhan: Wuhan Chuban She, 1998), 
35–6. My thanks to Charles Aylmer, the head librarian, for clarifying the information on these two documents.   
2 
 
 
The protection of ancestral tombs, together with farmland, is the animating motivation of this 
poster. People were ready to kill to protect these ancestral legacies. Europeans in China 
acquired land in this period for a variety of reasons, including the setting up of concessions, 
mining, and the building of consulates, homes, warehouses, offices, roads, and railways. 
When colonial authorities attempted to obtain land on which tombs were located, the 
possibility that these might be destroyed aroused anti-foreign feeling, because tombs were 
sites of ancestor worship. As a custom with a long and involved history, ancestor worship 
was vitally important to traditional Chinese society.3  
There is no recorded evidence that the violence threatened in the wall poster actually 
broke out, but the poster reveals how ancestral tombs became a rallying point for resisting 
attempts at land acquisition by the foreign community. Not all resistance involved calls to 
arms like the one in Shanghai. Yet whenever there was local unrest of this kind, the colonial 
authorities, the Qing central government, and the local community were forced to the 
negotiation table. Concessions, more often than not, were offered by the Europeans to the 
Chinese. 
This paper recounts how tomb land and death practices— in particular, the belief in 
feng shui and the practice of keeping bodies for long periods in mortuaries for funeral 
ceremonies or for a return to the ancestral home for burial—featured in the process of 
colonial land acquisition.4  It explores how the belief system played a role in late Qing 
China’s foreign relations—specifically how it empowered popular and governmental 
                                                          
3 The earliest systematic description of Chinese death practices in anthropological style was achieved in 1868 by 
Justus Doolittle in his book: Social Life of the Chinese: A Daguerreotype of Daily Life in China (London: S. 
Low, Son, and Marston, 1868), chapters five to eight, pp.104-181. Following that Jan Jakob Maria de Groot 
published in 1892 his comprehensive and detailed study on Chinese death culture, entitled The Religious System 
of China: Its Ancient Forms, Evolution, History and Present Aspect, Manners, Customs and Social Institutions 
Connected Therewith, 6 vols.  (Leyden [Leiden]: E. J. Brill, 1892).  
4 For a general history and comprehensive discussion on Chinese funerals see 杨晓勇 Yang Xiaoyong and 徐吉
军 Xu Jijun, 中國殯葬史 Zhongguo binzang shi [A History of Chinese Funerals], 4 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo 
Shehui Chubanshe, 2008). For a history of death in Shanghai from 1840s to the 1950s see Christian Henriot, 
Scythe and the City: A Social History of Death in Shanghai (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016); for 
death history in the urban environment of Beijing see William R. Jankowiak, Sex, Death, and Hierarchy in a 
Chinese City: An Anthropological Account (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and Daniel Asen, 
Death in Beijing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). For studies on rural communities, see James 
L. Watson and Evelyn S. Rawski (ed.), Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1988). 
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resistance to imperial expansion.5 At the grassroots level, the possible destruction of ancestral 
tombs tapped into powerful collective emotions that mobilised local populations. Officials 
offered vigorous support for local resistance efforts, since death-related religious practices 
were manifestations of the dynastic imperial ideology. In late Qing China’s interaction with 
the West, the death practices became a political force to be reckoned with. 
This paper views tombs and death practices of every Chinese person, commoners or 
not, as part of the religious-political fabric of Qing China. Protections of tombs and the 
performance of death rituals were responsibilities of the descendants as much as of the 
government. The Great Qing Code (Daqing Lüli) specified how and when corpses were to be 
buried, and criminalised the ‘exposure, manipulation, alteration, and destruction of dead 
bodies.’6 Tomb protections could trump land ownership, as evidenced by the case from 1880s 
Taiwan in which a descendant’s right to maintain an ancestral grave was upheld even though 
he did not own the piece of land. 7   In another example, the leader of the Li clan of 
Guangdong province’s Shunde District was plagued by guilt when selling a piece of land in 
1752, the proceeds of which were designated for ancestor worship—not even selling the tomb 
land per se.8 With their elevated legal and sociocultural position, tombs were sites of conflict, 
and sometimes become targets of destruction during clan feuds.9 Within a clan, tombs could 
become embroiled in family politics as members fought over the right to worship an ancestral 
tomb that was believed to contain fortuitous feng shui.10 Funeral rites were equally sacred. 
Governor General Duanfang (1861-1911), for example, lost his job in 1909 because under his 
                                                          
5 The main archival sources of this article are documents belonging to the foreign ministries of the Qing (Zongli 
Yamen) that are now housed in the archives of Academia Sinica, Taiwan. Records of treaties, treaty negotiations 
and other related document in libraries and archives in Taiwan, China, and the UK have also been consulted, in 
order to provide context for the cases examined. 
6 Jeff Snyder-Reinke, “Afterlives of the Dead: Uncovering Graves and Mishandling Corpses in Nineteenth-
Century China”, Frontiers of History in China, 11:1 (2016), pp.1-20; Weiting Guo, “Social Practice and Judicial 
Politics in ‘Grave Destruction’ Cases in Qing Taiwan, 1683–1895”, in Li Chen and Madeleine Zelin (eds.), 
Chinese Law: Knowledge, Practice, and Transformation, 1530s to 1950s (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp.84-123. 
7 Mark Allee, “Code, Culture, and Custom: Foundations of Civil Case Verdicts in Nineteenth Century County 
Court”, in Kathryn Bernhardt, Madeline Zelin, and Philip Huang (eds.), Civil Law in Qing and Republican 
China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp.131-132. 
8 Thomas Bouye, Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy: Violent Disputes over Property Rights in 
Eighteenth Century China (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), pp.142-143. 
9 Guo, “Social Practice and Judicial Politics in ‘Grave Destruction’”, pp. 92-93. 
10 Rubie Watson: “Remembering the Dead: Graves and Politics in Southeastern China”, in Watson and Rawski 
(ed.), Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China, pp. 203-226; Inequality among Brothers: Class and 
Kinship in South China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 88-90.  
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watch photographs were taken during Empress Dowager Cixi’s imperial sending off 
procession.11       
These records indicate that death practices were central in the nexus of political power 
in the Chinese society. When the practices were interrupted by the uninitiated foreigners, 
controversies surrounding death rituals burst into China’s foreign relations just at the time 
when the late Qing state was seeking to counter European imperial expansion. Death-related 
religious practices were thus transformed from domestic sociopolitical issues into a potent 
source of conflict in China’s foreign relations. This paper documents how culturally deep-
rooted death practices empowered resistance to European colonial expansion. Conflicts over 
tomb land and death rites contributed directly and indirectly to the development of China’s 
anti-foreign movements and to the national quest to reclaim sovereign rights. 12 It is a piece of 
history about how the living protected the dead and the dead empowered the living. 
 
 
Protecting the Dead 
The Qing government, the local elite, and the commoners all played a role in resisting the 
destruction of tombs and traditional death rites. The examples provided in this section prove 
that because tombs were sites of ancestor worship—thus giving them symbolic political 
meaning in the Qing imperial state ideology—they were likely to stir up resistance if their 
existence were threatened. In protecting ancestral tombs, officials and the local elite were 
attempting to prevent the erosion of political power rooted in the Confucian-Daoist tradition 
of ancestor worship. When facing the possible destruction of ancestral tombs, a clan leader 
could win the support of an official by appealing to these shared religious emotions. 
In 1887, the Hospital for Women and Children in Fuzhou, founded by the Woman’s 
Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States, wanted 
to expand its premises after a decade of success in its medical mission. 13  As the land 
                                                          
11 North China Herald, 27 Nov 1909. 
12 For an overview of anti-foreign sentiment in this period, see Kuang-Sheng Liao, Antiforeignism and 
Modernization in China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1990). For reclaiming of sovereign rights 
see for instance, En-han Lee, China’s Quest for Railway Autonomy, 1904–1911: A Study of the Chinese 
Railway-Rights Recovery Movement (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1977) and李恩涵 Lee, En-Han, 
晚清的收回礦權運動 Wanqing de shouhui kuangquan yundong [The Movement for the Recovery of Mining 
Rights in the Late Qing] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1963); Roberta Allbert Dayer, Bankers and Diplomats in 
China 1917–1925: The Anglo-American Experience. (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 15–23.  
13 For an account of the hospital see Frances J. Baker, The Story of the Woman’s Foreign Missionary Society of 
the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1869–1895 (New York, 1896), 155–63.  
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contained tombs, however, opposition arose from local elders and the gentry, some of whom 
had been given nominal official titles or were waiting to be appointed as officials. They were 
the elite of the local community. Twenty-three of them signed a petition arguing that sale of 
land to the church had not been agreed to by the whole community and was therefore invalid. 
What angered them most was seeing that the foreigners had already dug up seven graves and 
cut down pine trees planted around the tombs to attract auspicious feng shui. ‘The scene was 
truly saddening and everybody was upset,’ wrote the petitioners of the village. 14  
The Qing officials in charge of treaty port matters in Fuzhou sided with the local 
community and informed the missionaries that the land sale had not been properly registered 
and that building work would have to cease. Faced with this opposition, the American consul 
in Fujian, Joseph C.A. Wingate (in office 1880–1890), asked the governor-general to 
intervene. He argued that the sale had already been agreed to and that the landowners, who 
had subsequently been arrested for making the sale, should be released immediately. The case 
was finally settled after a year of negotiations. Given that the hospital was a charitable 
enterprise and the damage to the tombs had already been done, the local elites agreed that the 
hospital could continue to use the land that had already been developed. But the untouched 
tomb land that would have to be returned to the owner. The Qing authorities also reiterated 
the prohibitions against building on tomb land in the area.15  
Compromises were offered by both sides in the dispute between the American 
missionaries and the people of Fuzhou, but that was not the outcome in a case of Russian land 
acquisition in the port of Yantai. In 1902, when the Russians stationed in Yantai wanted to 
move their consulate into the area where Europeans gathered, they had their eye on a nearby 
cemetery belonging to the Liu clan. The owners refused to sell the land, however, saying that 
they could not bear to witness the desecration of ancestral tombs. The governor of the 
province reported that the clan head was weeping in his office, and he believed the sentiments 
voiced reflected genuine sentiment rather than a ploy to extract a higher price. Upon learning 
of this, Russian officials agreed to respect the custom of venerating ancestors and pressed the 
case no further. When they instead expressed they would buy the land in the future if the clan 
                                                          
14 Academia Sinica, Taiwan, dossier 01-18-059-01. (‘Sinica’ hereafter).  Past and Present generally doesn’t use 
Chinese characters.  If Chinese characters are to be used, it’s better to put the author’s name in characters, then 
in pinyin; then the title in characters, followed by pinyin.  
If using pinyin English translation follows in a square bracket.  
It’s better to put pinyin titles in lower case, apart from the first word or for some proper nouns. 
15 Ibid. The governor-general was楊昌濬 Yang Changrui (1826–1897). 
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head changed his mind, the Qing central government warned the governor never under any 
circumstances to sell the land to foreign nationals to pre-empt possible diplomatic rows.16  
A tomb conflict in Anhui became even more complicated than the disputes in Yantai 
and Fuzhou. A three-hundred-year-old grave was at the centre of the province’s mining rights 
recovery movement between 1905 and 1908.17 The London and China Company signed a 
deal in May 1904 that granted the right to mine iron ore in exchange for a contribution of 
£50,000 (400,000 liang) to the local government, a sum which amounted to half of the 
province’s annual budget. In 1905, local elites—including the titled gentry, landowners, and 
merchants of the province—petitioned the government to abandon the plan and raised 10,000 
liang to set up a mining company of their own to replace the British venture. Their efforts 
failed, however, and the British project went ahead.18  
When the London and China Company began building roads towards the mine, 
however, they damaged the ancestral tomb of the Pan family, prompting the governor of 
Anhui to complain to the Qing foreign ministry, arguing that there was a great possibility of 
social unrest, especially given the reputedly fearless character of the locals. The governor and 
the local elites together used the damage to the Pan family’s tomb to initiate a movement 
aimed at recovering mining rights, even though there was only a single tomb involved and the 
damage was limited.19 A local newspaper, set up specifically to whip up patriotic sentiment, 
reported on the incident and made the more general claim that ancestral tombs were under 
threat.20 The Anhui elite’s commercial interests and their patriotic movement for the recovery 
of mining rights merged into a form of economic nationalism. The local officials and the 
local elite stirred up public anger over tomb damage to raise the stakes in their bargaining 
with Qing central government and successfully forced it to renegotiate with the foreigners. 
Faced with the threat of public unrest, the company agreed to give up its mining 
rights, but asked for £400,000 pounds, later reduced to £275,000, as compensation for the 
investments already made in equipment and road construction. The British minister in Beijing 
intended to back down after learning that the company’s contracts with the Qing government 
                                                          
16 Sinica, dossier 02-11-011-01. The governor was 張人駿 Zhang Renjun (1847–1927); Yantai, old name: 
Chefoo. 
17 For the movement for the recovery of mining rights in Anhui see Lee, Wanqing de shouhui kuangquan 
yundong, 163–75. For history of modern mining see Tim Wright, Coal Mining in China’s Economy and Society 
1895-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
18 Sinica dossier 02-04-018-03. 
19 Ibid. The governor of Anhui was誠勳 Cheng Xun. 
20 安徽俗話報 Anhui suhua bao [Anhui Vernacular News], 14 Aug 1904. 
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were expired when the company damaged the tomb. The company, however, managed to 
raise the issue in the British parliament, where the foreign secretary, Edward Grey (1862–
1933), was forced to take up the issue, though he did not commit himself to any specific 
course of action. After three years of wrangling, the two sides agreed that the Qing 
government would return the company’s £50,000 contribution and pay £2,000 
compensation.21 
These examples testify to the complexities of tomb-land issues. When a tomb was 
destroyed, it could be a genuine heart-felt grievance as expressed by the local elites in Fuzhou 
and the Liu clan in Yantai. But it could also serve as the rallying point for other nationalist or 
economic purposes, as in the case in Anhui, where anger over the threat to ancestral tomb 
land was used by the locals together with the local government to advocate for the return of 
mining rights. In the Fuzhou case, the locals and the officials were not uncompromising; they 
could be reconciliatory and pragmatic when charitable work was involved and tombs had 
already been dug up. The government, in short, believed that it was in its interest to protect 
tomb land both because of prevailing ideology and out of deference to local sentiment. Both 
the government and the local community were not averse to compromise, however, when it 
served local interests and suited government policy toward foreign powers.  
In general, the archival documents show that foreign land acquisition involving tombs 
had the potential to arouse collective emotions—anguish, sadness, hatred and shame—which 
would rally locals to protest and resist. Officials then often stepped in to express their 
concerns to foreign representatives and to negotiate.  
 
Tomb Land and Feng Shui Diplomacy 
The power of the ancestors lay dormant but manifested when facing destruction. Its power 
was derived from widely shared religious practices that combined popular customs for 
ancestor worship, Confucianism, and Daoism. According to popular beliefs, ancestors had 
access to deities who would decide one’s fortune based on whether the descendent behaved 
morally and provided the necessary nourishment to their ancestors in the form of food, 
incense and joss paper burnt as currency for the afterlife, offered in front of the tomb or a 
memorial tablet at home.22 The feng shui (alignment with perceived natural forces) of tombs 
                                                          
21 Sinica dossier 02-04-018-03. 
22 Emily M. Ahern, The Cult of the Dead in a Chinese Village (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); and 
Constance A. Cook, Death in Ancient China: The Tale of One Man’s Journey (Leiden: Brill, 2006). A grave 
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was an integral part of ancestor worship. According to Daoist theory, the feng shui of the 
place where ancestors were buried was believed to have an auspicious or malign impact on 
the health, wealth, marriage, fertility, fortune and other matters of their descendants. 
Disasters could be brought upon a neighbourhood if an adjacent tomb’s feng shui was 
disrupted.23  When Europeans in China attempted to acquire land that contained tombs, they 
were treading on sensibilities arising from these beliefs. James L. Watson and Evelyn S. 
Rawski have argued that in nineteenth-century China ancestor worship was omnipresent in 
everyday life and ‘had achieved important commonalities in belief that cut across the 
boundaries of regions and social strata,’ creating a standardized ‘Chinese way of death’.24 
They have also argued that ancestor worship had strong links with political authority—a 
connection that can be traced back to the Late Shang state (ca 1200–1045 BC). The 
relationship between religion and politics evolved into a key element of orthodox 
Confucianism. Ancestor worship was an important ritual of the Confucian state and was 
performed by the rulers and people alike in everyday life.25   
The government wrote the national belief system into the law. The key legal text of the 
Qing dynasty: The Great Qing Code had a series of regulations on tomb and corpse 
protection. Any person that violated the law could be sentenced to corporal punishment; exile; 
or, in the most serious cases, strangulation.26 Article 276.6, for instance, stipulates: ‘One who 
levels the gravemound of another person for a field or garden will receive 100 strokes of the 
heavy bamboo.’27  
Qing bureaucrats incorporated the concept of tomb protection into treaties, conventions, 
contracts, and land regulations concerning foreigners. The Shanghai Land Regulations of 
1845, for example, drawn up by Shanghai Governor Gong Mujiu (1788–1848), were the first 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
could become a site of pilgrimage and miraculous beliefs because the son or daughter followed the prescribed 
mourning vigil by living next the tomb for three years, see Thomas David Dubois, “Manchukuo’s Filial Sons: 
States, Sects and the Adaptation of Graveside Piety”, East Asian History, No. 36 (December 2008), pp. 3-27. 
23 For studies on feng shui see Ole Bruun, An Introduction to Feng Shui (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), and Fengshui in China: Geomantic Divination between State Orthodoxy and Popular Religion 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2003).陈进国 Chen Jinguo, 信仰、仪式与乡土社会:风水的历史人类学探索
Xinyang, yishi, yu xiangtu shehui: Fengshui de lishi renleixue tansuo [Belief, Ritual, and Rural Society: The 
Anthropology of Fengshui in Fujian, China] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2005). 
24 Watson and Rawski eds. Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China, p. 23.   
25 Ibid., pp. xi, 22,30. 
26 The Great Qing Code, translated by William C. Jones with the assistance of Tianquan Cheng and Yongling 
Jiang. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 260–263. 
27 Ibid, 262. 
9 
 
to include protection of tomb land and death practices.28 The rules that came to define official 
tomb land safeguarding were established in the 1854 version of the Shanghai Land 
Regulations. Article 3 of the regulations stipulated that: ‘If there are graves or coffins on the 
land rented, their removal must be a matter of separate agreement, it being contrary to the 
custom of the Chinese to include them in the agreement of deed of sale’.29 This effectively 
elevated for special protections land with tombs. And Article 11 states:  
 
In no case shall the graves of Chinese on land rented by foreigners be removed 
without the express sanction of the families to whom they belong, who also, so long 
as they remain unmoved, must be allowed every facility to visit and sweep them at 
the established period, but no coffins of Chinese must hereafter be placed within the 
said limits, or be left above ground.30 
 
Compromises, as the articles show, were made on both the Chinese and European sides: the 
rights of existing tombs were respected while the new ones disallowed. These same clauses 
were written into the 1869 and 1898 land regulations governing foreign concessions in 
Shanghai. 31  The well-known Chinese medical practitioner Zhang Xiangyun (1855–1925) 
resorted to these laws when he refused to move his ancestral tombs. Zhang’s family cemetery 
fell within the limits of the Shanghai International Settlement after its 1899 expansion. The 
land was then acquired by a successful Jewish businessman, Silas Aaron Hardoon (1851–
1931), who incorporated it into his 171 mu (34 acre) home—the Aili Garden. When Zhang 
refused to give up his ancestral tombs in the middle of Hardoon’s private estate, Hardoon was 
forced by law to permit family visits to the tombs.32 Given that the Zhang family had been 
celebrated Chinese physicians for several generations, their refusal to disgorge the land might 
be a reflection of the stock they placed in their family’s success, attributable to the auspicious 
feng shui of the land their ancestral tombs occupied. 
                                                          
28 For the drawing up of the regulation, see Yuen-Sang Leung, The Shanghai Taotai: Linkage Man in a 
Changing Society, 1843–90 (Singapore: NUS Press, 1990), p. 48. 宫慕久 Kung Mu-Chi. 
29 For Shanghai Land Regulation English edition, see The National Archives, London, Public Record Office 
(hereafter PRO), FO 17 /515. 
30 Ibid.  
31  Land Regulations and Bye-Laws for the Foreign Settlement of Shanghai, North of the Yang-king-pang 
(Shanghai: Printed at the North-China Herald Office, 1907). 
32  For Aili Garden see Chiara Betta, “Silas Aaron Hardoon (1851–1931): Marginality and Adaptation in 
Shanghai” (School of Oriental and African Studies PhD thesis, 1997), pp. 76–83. 張驤雲 Zhang Xiangyun. 
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Qing officials were attuned to feng shui issues more broadly than the narrow but 
important tomb-land issue. In negotiations with the French and British in Shanghai in 1856, 
for example, Chinese officials decided that foreign activities in the area should not disrupt the 
feng shui of a nearby neighbourhood.33 This idea was codified in a trade agreement with 
Japan in 1871 that states: ‘The local magistrates shall see that no harm accrues to dwellings, 
tombs, or geomancy [feng shui].’34 From then on the Chinese wording ‘buguan fangxiang’ 
(literally: ‘not concerning alignments/directions’), meaning feng shui, was often quoted in 
official papers as justification for disallowing requests from foreigners and in arguments in 
official documents.35  
The German minister Max von Brandt (1835–1920) was doubtful of the meaning of 
feng shui when he, along with other representatives in Beijing, was informed by Qing 
officials in 1880 that none of the land on Wushi Hill in Fuzhou could be leased under any 
circumstances because the locals regarded this hill as the seat of auspicious feng shui for the 
city. Foreigners who had wished to rent land on the hill had come into conflict with locals 
many times since 1851.36 Nearly a dozen letters exchanged between the two sides captures 
the debate over the concept. The Qing officials argued that the feng shui question could 
trigger public unrest, and if the feng shui was disturbed it would bring disaster upon the 
neighbourhood. Von Brandt objected, stating that feng shui was such a vague concept that it 
could be applied to any case of land acquisition. 37  Von Brandt’s concerns were not 
unfounded, for a Qing negotiator in 1856 was instructed to use feng shui as an excuse to 
reject a British request for the lease of Kongtong Island, which would have sparked a 
diplomatic row because an earlier French bid had been rejected.38  
Foreigners did not need to dig up tombs to destroy the feng shui of an area—they 
could do that merely by their presence. A group of American missionaries led by Gilbert Reid 
                                                          
33 Sinica dossier, 01-18-062-02. 
34 Inspector General of Customs, Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States (Shanghai: 
Published at the Statistical Dept. of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1917), p. 1244. 
35 For instances of ‘buguan fangxiang’ see Sinica files: 01-18-043-01-013, 01-18-060-02-004, 01-12-077-02-
019, 01-18-043-01-013, 01-18-056-02, 01-11-021-01-005, 01-11-021-01-006.  不關方向 Buguan fangxiang. 
36 For the Wushi Hill exchanges between the Qing and British officials see PRO: FO 228/568, FO 228/589, and 
FO 228/956. For requests to lease Wushi Hill see Sinica files, 01-02-001-03-016, 01-18-012-03-001 and dossier 
01-12-162-01. Wushi Hill (Wushi shan 烏石山); Similar arguments about a city’s feng shui were made by 
people of Guangzhou in 1912 in against the Republican military government’s road construction, see Shuk-Wah 
Poon, Negotiating Religion in Modern China: State and Common People in Guangzhou (Hong Kong: The 
Chinese University Press, 2011),  pp. 45-46. 
37 Sinica dossier, 01-12-162-01.   
38 Sinica file, 01-18-066-01-042, 倥侗 Kongtong. 
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(1857–1927) came to Ji’nan city in 1887. They rented a house and were beaten up on their 
first night there. The locals argued that the mere presence of the missionaries disrupted the 
feng shui of the neighbourhood.39  The anti-foreign sentiment in some areas—not in the 
majority of the counties—hardened into the belief that foreigners were devils.40 In other anti-
missionary incidents, feng shui was often invoked in objections to the construction of 
churches and foreign cemeteries, as if the very sight of Christian symbols would upset the 
spirit of the land. 41  The language of feng shui bespoke anti-foreign sentiment in these 
localities. Officials cited it as much as an excuse to reject lease agreements as a point of real 
concern.42 
In Tianjin—a port opened to European trade and to foreign concessions in the wake of 
the Second Opium War (1856–1860)—Qing officials took great care not to upset public 
sentiment.43 The British Concession, established in 1860 as the first of its kind in the city, 
choose relatively empty ground—likely a result of their experiences in Shanghai. 44  The 
regulations for the French Concession, agreed to in 1861, stipulated the same conditions as 
the 1854 Shanghai Land Regulation for the protection of tombs, but added that in the case of 
Chinese descendants willing to move, the French should pay compensation of one liang per 
tomb.45  
The same official apprehension about social unrest over land acquisitions by 
foreigners manifested in the granting of mining and railway rights to foreign companies. As 
early as 1867, officials expressed concern that building railways would destroy tombs and 
damage feng shui; this in turn could provoke the locals to take up arms and rebel.46 That 
                                                          
39 Sinica file, 01-18-056-02. For Reid see, Tsou Mingteh, “Christian Missionary as Confucian Intellectual: 
Gilbert Reid and the Reform Movement in the Late Qing”, in Daniel Bays (ed.) Christianity in China, from the 
Eighteenth Century to the Present (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 73–90.  
40 For the connection between anti-foreign sentiment and the designation of ‘devil’ during imperial aggression 
see Lydia Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge MA.: 
Harvard University Press, 2004), esp. Chapter 3. 
41 For examples of opposition to missionary activities on the grounds of feng shui see Sinica files 01-18-059-01, 
01-12-077-02-019, 01-12-162-01-001, 01-12-025-01, 01-14-002-01-074, 01-12-152-02-001.    
42  Bruun argues similar cases of feng shui as a discourse used by the Chinese government to encourage 
nationalism, especially on the point of foreigners’ ‘respect for native religion’, see Ole Bruun, Fengshui in 
China, p. 36. 
43 For the Second Opium War (Arrow War) see J. Y. Wong, Deadly Dreams: Opium and the Arrow War (1856–
1860) in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and James Hevia, English Lessons: The 
Pedagogy of Imperialism in Ningteenth-Century China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
44 天津租界檔案選編 Tianjin zujie dang’an xuan bian [Selection of Archives on the Concessions of Tianjin] 
(Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1992), 5–7. And PRO, FO 228/316, and FO 228/334. 
45 Tianjin zujie dang’an, p. 100. 
46寶鋆 Bao Yun (ed.), 籌辦夷務始末:同治 Chouban yiwu shimo:tongzhi [History of the Management of 
Foreign Affairs: Tongzhi ] (Beijing: 1930), juan 51, p. 21; juan 53, p. 5; juan 55, p. 13. 
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concern was reflected in the drafting of the Contract for the Construction and Operation of 
the Chinese Eastern Railway, negotiated in 1896 with Russia. Article 2 states: ‘In laying out 
this line, cemeteries and tombs, as also towns and villages, should so far as possible be 
avoided and passed by.’47 When in 1898 mining rights in Hunan province were granted to the 
Peking Syndicate (a British corporation), the same protection was sought.48 As mentioned 
above in the Anhui case, tomb-land issues mixed the patriotic aspirations of local elites with 
their commercial interest in recovering mining rights. A similar dynamic could be seen in the 
grassroots reaction to the building of foreign-owned railways.49  
Between the 1840s and 1880s, as far as treaty negotiations were concerned, Qing 
officials were capable of protecting the visible symbols of its ruling ideology. In the 1890s, 
however, as foreign interests scrambled for expanded concessions, Qing diplomats retained 
control but cracks in the system of protections began to appear.50 In Tianjin, where the British 
and French were earlier persuaded to accept Qing terms, the diminished Qing government 
began to give in on tomb-land protections. When the regulations for Tianjin’s German 
Concession were negotiated in 1895, the Germans at first asked for all tombs to be removed, 
but compromises were solicited by the Qing. The resulting compromise included four (of 
nineteen clauses) that related to regulating tomb land. The first three favoured the Qing 
position and reiterated the same conditions for tombs as in the French Concession. The 
agreement also added protections specifically for tombs for Chinese officials to be ‘left 
unmolested’ and included protections for charitable cemeteries belonging to native 
associations in Tianjin.51 The fourth clause, however, reflected more favourable terms for the 
foreign interests by agreeing that tombs could be subject to negotiation for removal to 
facilitate road construction, with the exception of tombs belonging to ‘notable families’. It 
left commoners’ tombs unprotected. The same rules were written into the land regulations of 
                                                          
47 Inspector General of Customs, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, p. 75. 
48 Ibid., pp. 132 and 700. The same rules applied to other mining contracts signed in this period, see for instance, 
Ibid., pp.185–6, and 659. 
49 For the railway rights recovery movement on the grassroots level see宓汝成 Mi, Rucheng (ed.) 近代中國鐵
路史資料 Jingdai Zhongguo tielu shi ziliao [Source Book of Modern Chinese Railway History] (Taipei, 1977), 
1239–1297; for the movement in general see Lee, China’s Quest for Railway Autonomy, 1904–1911. 
50 For weakening of the Qing and the influence of foreign powers see Robert Bickers. The Scramble for China: 
Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832–1914 (London: Penguin, 2012). 
51 For the land regulation see Tianjin zujie dang’an, pp. 161-165; and “Convention in Regard to a Concession in 
the Treaty Port of Tientsin”, in MacMurray and John Van Antwerp (eds.) Treaties and Agreements with and 
Concerning China, 1894–1919, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), vol. 1, 42-45 and 50. For 
the process of negotiation see Sinica dossier, 01-18-049-02. 
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the Japanese Concession in Tianjin, settled in 1898.52 It was no longer the case as in 1854 
when the Qing could demand that: ‘In no case shall the graves of Chinese on land rented by 
foreigners be removed’.  
After the Boxer War (1900-1901), the Qing retained little of their negotiating power. 
During the war, eight imperial powers joined forces to quash the Boxers—Chinese peasants 
who claimed to possess magical protection against bullets and had killed European diplomats, 
missionaries and others.53  Four further concessions—belonging to Russia, Belgium, Italy and 
Austria-Hungary—were set up in Tianjin after the war.54 The Qing officials in charge of the 
negotiations were repeatedly urged by their superior, Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), to 
persuade the four nations to abandon the land that they had chosen, for there were too many 
tombs involved, especially in the Italian concession, which had nearly ten thousand. This 
time, however, the site of ancestor veneration could not be protected because the Boxer War 
had emboldened the foreigners. Not only was the government weak, but the war had also 
devastated local communities, leaving them too debilitated to organise any meaningful 
resistance to foreign claims. The Qing China of 1901 was both militarily and morally weak. 
Under these circumstances, the most the Qing officials were able to achieve was an increase 
in the compensation for moving the tombs, from one to four liang.55  
A display of Qing powerlessness also met a 1902 Italian demand to use a cemetery 
in the village of Huangcun in Zhili province as a military camp for troops victorious in the 
Boxer conflict. Under heavy pressure from the Italians, Qing officials decided to buy the land 
using official powers and then to rent it to the Italians, instead of the usual practice of letting 
the two sides reach a price themselves. The handling of the purchase was intended to deflect 
the anger directed at foreigners and avoid further unrest.56 In its final decade, the Qing central 
government was too worn down by external and domestic forces to tend to this key symbol of 
its ruling ideology.  
While the strength of the Qing imperial state was the paramount force in tomb 
protection, negotiations over tomb land also depended on the particular Qing officials in 
                                                          
52 Tianjin zujie dang’an, p.192. 
53  Robert Bickers and R.G. Tiedemann (eds.), The Boxers, China, and the World (London: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007). 
54 For the Boxer War, instead of the usual phrase of Boxer Uprising or Boxer Rebellion see, Bickers and 
Tiedemann (eds.), The Boxers. 
55Tianjin zujie dang’an, pp.331, 359, 365-366, 388, 390, 393, 398, 437 474, and 475. 李鴻章 Li Hongzhang. 
The Qing official in charge of negotiations on the ground was周馥 Zhou Fu (1837–1921). 
56 Sinica, dossier, 02-26-001-02.  黃村 Huangcun. 
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charge and the local circumstances. Qing bureaucrats were a variegated collection of 
individuals. Although they received similar educations, the diversity of their experiences 
resulted in a variety of judgements, especially when it came to the new challenge of dealing 
with Westerners. Li Hongzhang, in charge of foreign affairs in the northern ports, ordered his 
subordinates time and again to make tombs a priority in Tianjin’s negotiations, and this was 
the driving force behind tomb protection there.57 Li’s extensive experience in overseeing 
treaty ports had attuned him to the danger of public unrest resulting from the tomb issue.58 
While Li was able to so some extent to push for tomb-land protections during negotiations 
with the Germans in Tianjin in 1895, tombs did not feature in land regulations negotiated the 
same year with the Germans in Hankou, where Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909) was in charge.59 
The same was true of the land regulations negotiated by Zhang with Japan, Britain, and 
France in Hankou around this time.60 Tombs in Hankou deemed to ‘offend the eye’ by the 
Japanese were to be removed. The same went for concessions in Shashi and Suzhou.61 In 
comparison with Li, Zhang seemed to be less attuned to tomb land issues. It appears, however, 
that few tombs were involved and there was no concerted opposition from the people of 
Hankou, Suzhou and Shashi. In such cases, Zhang was neither driven by local demands for 
preservation nor assisted by local interest.  
The Qing officials who stood between public anger and foreign demands were not 
only mediating  peaceful solutions,  they were also negotiating their own legitimacy to 
govern.62  As death-related religious beliefs were tied inextricably to state ideology, it was the 
duty of officials to afford protection. Inaction could endanger their legitimacy. Officials, 
moreover, were believers themselves, and therefore attuned to the mood of their own society.  
After the First Opium War, Qing officials were forced to attend also to the needs of foreign 
                                                          
57 Sinica files 01-18-062-02-011, 01-18-062-02-017. 
58  For Li’s experience of dealing with foreigners see Kwang-Ching Liu, “Li Hung-Chang in Chihli: The 
Emergence of a Policy, 1870–1875” in Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphey, and Mary C. Wright, eds. 
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Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge MA.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 張之洞 
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powers and were pragmatic in their dealings. Before the late 1890s, their priorities rested in 
mainly in the protection of traditional beliefs and rituals system to reassure the public. In 
subsequent years, as Qing state power waned, foreign demands started to override more 
traditional concerns.  
 
 
Fighting to Death for Death Practices  
Aside from tomb land and the concept of feng shui, another foreign relations flashpoint arose 
from mortuary practices that involved weeks-long rituals before burial or the keeping of 
corpses for years while they awaited the return to ancestral lands for burial. The common 
idiom ‘falling leaves return to their roots (luoye guigen)’ gave expression to the belief of the 
necessity in burial in one’s hometown. In major cities like Shanghai and Tianjin, native place 
associations customarily bought land in nearby suburbs for charitable mortuaries for deceased 
sojourners as temporary resting places before eventual burial back home. The remains could 
stay in coffins above ground for years.63 In these mortuary practices, land acquisition once 
again played a part, as they happened in areas either newly acquired by or adjacent to 
Europeans. Ruth Rogaski argues that colonial authorities were fearful of the mortuary 
practices, because in their eyes the unhygienic ways of the Chinese ‘might hide a host of 
hygienic sins that could threaten the health of the white population’.64 The Europeans wanted, 
therefore, to curb the practices, setting the colonial powers once again on a collision course 
with local beliefs. A number of cases show local communities were even more likely to insist 
on their right to uphold mortuary practices, for they were more intimate and immediate than 
the issue of tombs and the concept of feng shui. 
As with clashes over other death practices, different conflicts resulted in different 
outcomes. A conflict in the Belgian Concession in Tianjin, for example, met with stiff 
resistance while another in Ningbo resulted in a degree of compromise from the Chinese. In 
1882, the people of Ningbo set out to build a charitable mortuary for the victims of drowning 
                                                          
63 帆苅浩之 Hiroyuki Hokari, “清末上海四明公所の「運棺ネットワーク」の形成 : 近代中国社会におけ
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64  Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China (Berkeley: 
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or death on board ships. The original plan called for the construction of a mortuary and three 
pavilions beside the river. Construction of the mortuary was nearly completed when the 
foreign community got wind of the project. The British and American consuls then registered 
objections to the Qing authorities, arguing that the buildings, although not in their 
concessions, were only 987 feet away from the British Consulate and 637 feet from the 
British police bureau.  They feared that the proximity might allow for the spread of disease to 
the concessions. Because the mortuary was intended as a charitable institution, the Chinese 
side effectively maintained the moral high ground. The local gentry went so far as to argue 
that the foreigners opposed the plan because they had bought up the land surrounding the area 
as an investment and land prices might fall because of the mortuary. They further disputed 
that the charitable mortuary and pavilions were set up precisely for the purpose of preventing 
the spread of disease from dead bodies lying on river banks. In the end, the two sides 
compromised. The three pavilions were not built, but the mortuary remained, though it was 
agreed that corpses would be kept in the mortuary for no more than a month.65  
The Belgian Concession in Tianjin, set up in 1901, included a populous Chinese 
village along a riverbank, since better locations were already occupied by the eight other 
foreign concessions. To curb weeks–long mortuary practices during a time that plague was 
spreading in north China, the Belgian consul Albert Disière (in office 1906–1914), devised a 
set of regulations to govern the funeral rites of the villagers in the concession. The regulations 
required burial within three days and levied a fine of one yuan for keeping bodies in 
mortuaries between one and three weeks, ten yuan for up to eight weeks, and two additional 
yuan for each week after that. Deaths were to be reported within twenty-four hours; failure to 
do so would entail a fine of one yuan. The Municipal Council would also monitor the quality 
of coffins. In the case of an epidemic, further regulations would be introduced. These 
regulations caused an outcry among the villagers, who labelled the fines a ‘death tax (siren 
jun)’ and believed the foreigners were seeking the most offensive way to tax them. The 
villagers successfully petitioned the Chinese authorities to intervene, and in the face of public 
pressure and the refusal to comply, the new regulations were quietly abandoned.66 In the end, 
Disière’s fear of Chinese death practices had not the least impact on local death rituals. 
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Peaceful resolution, however, eluded authorities in Shanghai’s French Concession, 
where violent protests flared up after the French attempted to disrupt their burial rites.67 Once 
again conflict arose over charitable mortuaries. Around the 1870s, the French Municipal 
Council—the self-governing body of the Shanghai French Concession—began paying 
compensation for the removal of tombs and mortuaries from the concession. The largest 
mortuary alone housed six to seven thousand sets of remains. It belonged to Ningbo natives 
living in Shanghai and was called Siming Gongsuo (Siming Hall). In response to the 
compensation, the community was at first divided over whether to sell the land to French and 
move the mortuary out, but in the end they refused the deal. In a seemingly provocative 
action in 1874, the French Municipal Council announced plans to construct two roads that 
would cut through the north side of the mortuary and cemetery compound. On 3 May that 
year, clashes between the municipal police and Ningbo natives broke out for the first time, 
and one Chinese was killed. The death sparked a riot the following day, which led to the 
burning of French houses and further Chinese deaths. In the face of this violence, French and 
Chinese officials stepped in. Ernest Godeaux (1833–1906), who was in charge of the French 
Consulate in Shanghai, made the Municipal Council abandon the road construction proposal, 
while the Qing government agreed to compensate the Council for the damage caused by the 
riot.68 
The story, however, had not yet reached an end. Twenty-four years later, another 
clash broke out over the Siming Hall. Responding to signs of plague in the city in 1898, the 
anxious Municipal Council attempted to tear down the wall of the Siming compound and 
remove the remains by force. Violence broke out, and seventeen Chinese were killed, 
including women and children. Hundreds of thousands of people then joined a strike 
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organised by the native place associations of Ningbo. The ranks of the protesters were 
swelled by Guangdong natives and other sojourners in the city, as well as Shanghai locals.69 
The case inflamed general anti-foreign sentiment which threatened to spread nationwide after 
the other communities of the treaty port joined in. The French soon abandoned their 
demands.70 The Ningbo migrants were uncompromising in their efforts to protect their rights 
to maintain religious practices. As an organisation for sojourners both living and dead, the 
Ningbo native place association in Shanghai summoned resistance as potent as that of 
communities in Tianjin and Ningbo.   
  
  
 
 
Selling the Ancestors 
While some were fighting to death to protect their death practices, others were ready to sell 
tomb land. Despite the general consensus on protecting ancestral tombs among the elite, the 
officials, and the local populace, some owners and fraudulent dealers continued to sell tomb 
land to foreigners. A property market had existed in China since at least the Song dynasty 
(960–1279), long before the first treaty port was established in 1842. 71  Market forces 
complicated the issue of land acquisition and added new difficulties to already troubled 
interactions. The examples below demonstrate that individual tomb land was readily sold to 
foreigners from the moment they arrived in China and that communities, especially 
impoverished ones lured by the prospect of compensation, collectively sold cemetery land. 
Charitable cemeteries set up by social organizations or by local governments were especially 
vulnerable. 
Of particular interest to unscrupulous land dealers was the five mu (one acre) of 
charitable cemetery land in the middle of the foreign quarters in Yantai. Sietas, Plambeck & 
Co applied unsuccessfully in 1869 to the Qing authorities to buy the cemetery land, which 
was next to their offices. The following year one Song Jingxing, a degree holder, under the 
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pseudonym Song Zhitian, forged title deeds and sold the land to the company. When the case 
was exposed, Song was stripped of his academic honours and a stone tablet was erected in the 
cemetery forbidding future sale. Seven years later, in 1877, the company again fell victim to a 
fraudster, Liu Xianzhou, who forged deeds and sold the land for 200 yuan. This time the local 
magistrate even put his seal on the deeds, possibly because he was in on the fraud. The case 
then came to the attention of Li Hongzhang, who was at the time serving as the 
Superintendent of Northern Trade. Li forbade the sale, saying that only by preventing their 
desecration would he avoid being plagued by a guilty conscience over the dry bones that lay 
in more than a hundred tombs of the cemetery. This time the company was not going to back 
down as easily. They appealed for help to the city’s Danish consul and to a Russian minister 
in Beijing. They also sold half the land to a British company so that the British minister 
would be involved. Li, representing officialdom’s staunch tomb protectors, refused to budge. 
He placed the safekeeping of the cemetery in the hands of a charitable association known as 
the Benevolent Hall (Guangren Tang). A wall was built to protect the tombs, paid for by the 
various native place merchants’ associations in the port.72  
A quarter-century later, in 1902, another fraudster, Li Xiyuan, together with a Chinese 
member of the company’s staff, Xu Deming, attempted to sell the land to the company for the 
third time, and again the deeds were stamped by the magistrate. The governor, Li Xijie, 
recommended to the Qing imperial court that it approve the land sale to the company as a 
way of solving the recurring problem. In this way, he argued, the Benevolent Hall would 
profit and the foreigners would have the land they wanted. The company was rumoured to 
have spent over 5,000 yuan in its attempts to acquire the land during the preceding decades, 
and Li argued that the company would not rest until it owned the land. After thirty years of 
wrangling and disproportionate cumulative expenses, Sietas, Plambeck & Co took ownership 
of the land with official consent.73 By this point, official corruption may have involved even 
the governor himself. 
Perhaps the most persistent of all the tomb-land sellers was Tang Caiting of Wuhu, a 
city located in Anhui province. Tang, together with his sons and associates, attempted five 
times in the early twentieth century to sell a piece of tomb land in a cemetery containing 
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more than a thousand tombs to different buyers: twice to missionaries; twice to Chinese 
businessmen; and, finally in 1914, to the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. The locals even 
established a ‘Tomb Protection Society (Bao ying hui)’ to coordinate their efforts to stop 
Tang’s attempted sales. The facts of this case are patchy, but it was clear that Tang was the 
legal owner of the tomb land, but the locals worried that the sale would endanger other tombs 
and the area’s feng shui.74 Opposition to Tang’s tomb-land sale demonstrates that even in 
cases of clear ownership, the community could step in and block the sale of the owner’s 
ancestral tombs.  
A case in Fuzhou further exemplifies the oppositional role of the local community. In 
1878, one Zhu Lianshen was punished by the local community for selling tomb land. Zhu 
bought a piece of land, originally to bury his recently deceased mother, but abandoned the 
plan when he became convinced that the feng shui was not auspicious. Three months later, 
upon learning that an American wished to buy land for residential building, Zhu snatched up 
another three plots of adjacent tomb land and sold the plots to the American for five hundred 
yuan. Zhu even paid the original owners to remove ancestral tombs and clear the land. When 
the locals got wind of the sale, they blocked the American’s construction plans. The 
American consul in Fuzhou then asked the governor of Fujian to intervene. The official 
dispatched to investigate reported that he was greeted by thousands of people who had come 
to express their anger. He discovered that the land contained ‘ancient tombs’ more than a 
century old, and the cemetery was marked with a stone tablet forbidding sale of the land that 
dated to the Qianlong era (1735–1795). This meant that the land was designated as a public 
cemetery that could be used free of charge. Judging from the documents, this might be a case 
of a local community working together with an official to fabricate the ‘public cemetery’ and 
‘ancient tomb’ status in order to strengthen their position in blocking a tomb-land sale. At any 
rate, Zhu was ordered to return the money to the American and was punished by the public 
humiliation of having to wear a cangue.75  
These cases make clear that local communities played a key role in foiling owners and 
fraudsters who want to sell tomb land. The community—in the form of a village and a circle 
of provincial elite that often included local officials—could block a deal on the principle of 
tomb-land protection or for the practical reason of preserving the area’s feng shui. On the 
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other hand, a local community could also come together to agree on selling cemetery land. 
There were at least two such cases. Because this kind of sale was regarded as sacrifice, the 
community expected the land to fetch high prices.  
In 1867 a group of Shanghai farmers sold farmland that included tombs to British 
merchants who intended to build a racecourse. They anticipated an imminent rise in land 
prices due to the development, and they wanted a share of the profits. At first they asked for 
60 yuan per mu but the company were willing to pay only 35 yuan. The negotiations ended 
with an ‘open contract (huoqi)’ according to which the farmers accepted 25 yuan. But the 
contract also contained a clause stipulating that once the land was ‘used (deyong)’ the 
company would pay an extra 125 yuan per mu. When the racecourse was built, the farmers 
asked for the money, but the company refused to pay on the grounds that the conditions for 
the further payments were only fulfilled when the land was used for residential building or 
resold, as the English-language contract stipulated. The land’s value did not appreciate 
because the land remained in the company’s hands as a racecourse. The company further 
argued that the prevailing land price in the area was 20 yuan per mu and 25 yuan was a better 
deal than the farmers could get elsewhere. In the end, the farmers did not even collect the 35 
yuan originally proposed. Because the contract and negotiations concentrated on the price 
rise, the question of moving the tombs located on the land was never clearly settled and no 
payment for it was ever made. 76  Motivated by economic gain, the farmers sacrificed their 
beliefs for a price, but that price fell woefully short of their expectations. 
In 1878 the Chinese Maritime Customs Service negotiated a deal with a local 
community in Wuhu to purchase a cemetery housing six-hundred tombs.77 Although the 
Maritime Customs Service was managed by foreigners, its managers had the status of 
Chinese officials, so the inspector general, Robert Hart (1835–1911), was able to strike a 
favourable deal. Originally, the locals asked for 50 yuan per piece of tomb land (width one 
zhang, length ten zhang) and an additional 7.5 yuan for moving each tomb. These prices were 
significantly higher than recorded sales of cemetery land in other places. The locals argued 
that this was because the land was in an area of auspicious feng shui and on high ground, 
which was scarce in low-lying Wuhu. Hart asked local authorities to buy the land for them 
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instead. After protracted negotiations the customs service finally agreed to pay a lump sum of 
8,000 yuan for the whole cemetery, which was higher than the estimated market price of 
6,000, but far short of the 33,000 the locals hoped for.78 Although the price fell short of the 
community’s expectations, they sold the tomb land anyway. Economic motives again 
trumped ancestor worship. 
 The selling of tomb land demonstrates that beliefs about tombs and a community’s 
emotional attachment to them were by no means the only forces governing tomb land issues. 
Economic considerations and the desire for monetary reward played a complicating role in 
the matter. While officials strongly supported local opposition in the Fuzhou and Yantai cases 
and were able to block the deal, in Wuhu, local officials acted as go-betweens, helping the 
community to negotiate the sale. The Wuhu case demonstrates that officials and the 
community could work together in the sale of tomb land. Because the Chinese Maritime 
Customs Service was part of the Qing government, it was likely that the people of Wuhu felt 
their land sale was officially sanctioned. The local officials in turn believed they were merely 
assisting the ‘Chinese officials’ from Maritime Customs. Nobody involved would feel 
particularly responsible and thus would avoid the guilt often arising from selling tomb land. 
As an unorthodox institution of the Qing government structure, the Maritime Customs had a 
unique capability to upend customs from within the government. But the consensus among 
the population and the officials of Wuhu was exceptional and rarely replicated elsewhere. 
Customary beliefs, nonetheless, were on display in all the cases, either as a reason for 
outright rejection or as a pretext for demanding higher prices. On balance, the belief system 
was powerful and widespread enough to either bar or complicate tomb land deals. 
 
 
Conclusions: Power of ancestors 
The omnipresence of death-related religious consciousness that combined both Confucianism 
and Daoism with local varieties in practice explains why most elites and commoners across 
China participated in the protection of tombs and death rites. Geography exercised little 
influence on the issue. Cases occurred in coastal treaty ports such as Fuzhou and Ningbo in 
the south, Shanghai in the Yangzi delta, and Yantai and Tianjin in the north. Incidents have 
also been recorded in the inland river areas of Wuhu, Anhui, and the nearby countryside 
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where foreigners for various purposes attempted to acquire land. In the Chinese world of life 
and death foreigners encountered no more trouble in tomb-land acquisition than a Chinese 
would have. The difference was that newly arrived foreigners often hungered for choice land 
in generally populated localities. The only available land was often the cemetery. While 
foreigners did not mind using burial land for development, the Chinese frequently avoided it. 
The desecration of tombs along with the disruption of death rites could quickly turn from a 
local issue into a diplomatic row, in which Qing officials either took the initiative on their 
own or were urged on by locals to bring the issue to negotiation. At first foreigners could not 
fully comprehend that use of tomb land for other purposes or requests to change customary 
funerary rites were problematic. Made to see how their views affronted Chinese sensibilities, 
the foreign community more often than not reached conciliatory arrangements. This power of 
ancestors in protecting against foreign incursion, however, was limited to particular localities. 
While a few incidents flared up and threatened to spread, none sparked nationwide anti-
foreign movements. On the whole, the power of the ancestors did not by itself jeopardise 
colonial power or cause a lasting impediment to the expansion of European imperialism. 
The power of ancestors in Qing China resonates with resistance to colonial authority 
in Tunisia where death rites were also deeply politicized. During the 1930s, the French 
colonists faced steep challenges resulting from their mismanagement of burial rites of 
Muslims, who had under the colonial regime become French citizens. The local community 
denied theses Muslims’ rights of burial in the Islamic cemeteries because they believed that 
accepting French citizenship was an act of apostasy. Mary Dewhurst Lewis argues that this 
was a key event in the development of Tunisian nationalism and in the funding of the modern 
nation. 79  In comparison, in Qing China, the disruption of death practices by colonial powers 
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did not erupt into a nationwide anti-foreign movement. The difference is revealing. The Qing 
bureaucrats who sat at the centre of the power nexus created by ancestral tombs and colonial 
desires for land acquisition and acted as protectors of traditional burial rites were the primary 
reason of the divergence between the two societies in facing colonial encroachment. 
The Qing bureaucrats mediating between local communities and foreign powers were 
driven as much by their concern for the future of China and its foreign relations as by the 
need to assert the legitimacy of their rule. Concentrating their efforts on facilitating peaceful 
interactions between Qing subjects and foreign powers, they sought to reduce conflict, protect 
the Qing empire, and maintain their legitimacy. Death practices effectively empowered them 
in their negotiations with Europeans. To write into treaties the protection of tombs, 
mortuaries, and traditional death rites was a way of leveraging local beliefs and public 
sentiment to bear on foreigners—above all, they had been trained all their lives to use the pen 
(or brush) as a weapon. Public sentiment and the threat of unrest were ammunition for 
officials conducting China’s foreign relations. They employed religious practices as a power 
source to further negotiations, but they did not use the sentiments in ways that would rally the 
people to drive out foreigners as the Tunisians did. Through the Qing bureaucrats’ 
intervention, concessions were made at times by the Chinese, as in the cases of the Hospital 
for Women and Children in Fuzhou and Ningbo’s charitable mortuary, although in most 
cases colonial authorities relented in the face of public protests and potentially explosive 
communal anger. The Qing bureaucrats negotiated their way out of the death crises by 
dissipating the explosive force generated from the community. After all, their primary 
sociopolitical imperative was to protect dynastic rule by finding acceptable solutions for the 
particular problems of various localities. Modern Chinese nationalism, which was at a 
formational stage during the last two decades of the Qing, was not yet the guiding principle 
that it would be for subsequent governments. But the Qing’s imperial universalist pretensions 
enabled them to view foreigners not merely as aliens but as another community to be pacified 
and governed by the Chinese bureaucracy. Foreign interests were thus realigned with the 
interests of the state by making the foreign community aware of the raw emotions 
surrounding burial rites and the depth of their importance to Chinese society and the 
maintenance of public order. Largely thanks to the bureaucrats’ mediation, disputes over 
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death practices did not lead to nationwide anti-foreign movements or rebellion against the 
Qing government. 
The broader picture shows that because death practices were a fundamental part of the 
national psyche, the Qing, as a religious-political state, had a stake in protecting tomb land 
and death rites. In exercising this power of ancestors, the Qing bureaucrats up to the late 
1890s were still capable of finding middle ground between the demands of the foreign 
community and the demands of its own subjects. The approach of Qing officials reflected a 
core social value and was thus incorporated into negotiations and treaties with foreigners. 
This finding bolsters John King Fairbank’s argument that Qing bureaucrats were working 
together with, instead of simply being coerced by, foreigners on treaty port issues.80 The 
cases investigated here show that, in fact, Qing officials performed that complicated role with 
a great degree of resistance up until the last decade of the dynasty. By the late 1890s, 
however, the Qing central government’s ability to protect death practices had weakened, and 
after the Boxer War they were largely losing power to manage the issue. While the central 
government was weakening, as shown in the treaty negotiations after 1895, the local 
communities led by elites could still make use of the power of the ancestors in dealings with 
foreigners or to nudge officials to resist foreign encroachment. The 1902 Yantai case pitting 
Russia against the Liu clan, the 1901 case of the Belgian consul versus villagers in Tianjin, 
and the 1905-8 Anhui case displaying economic nationalism all demonstrate the undiminished 
strength of the local belief system even in the absence of central government support from the 
fading Qing state. The central government’s inability was due, however, to the gigantism of 
the crises that sprung up nationwide in the face of an imperial scramble to carve up China 
that overwhelmed the system, rather than the weakening of the grip of ancestral power on the 
state per se. Soon thereafter, the Qing, China’s last dynasty, would perish in the 1911 
Revolution 
Not every Chinese person, however, exhibited unease about the destruction of 
ancestral tombs. Those who were indifferent to social norms and unaffected by anti-foreign 
sentiment sometimes sold tomb land to Europeans. Monetary gain was generally the motive. 
Death practices, although a potent political weapon, provided incomplete protection in the 
face of economic incentives. As soon as China’s treat ports were opened, tomb land was sold 
to foreigners, either by legitimate owners or by fraudulent brokers. Poverty prompted 
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communities like Wuhu to exchange cemetery land for monetary gain. The sale of tomb land 
showed the power of market forces and foreshadowed China’s rapid development and 
urbanisation in the second half of the twentieth century, a time in which economic gain 
trumped the cultural significance of tomb land and death rites.81 The coming of Westerners 
introduced into China a new economic dynamic. What cultural practices the colonial powers 
could not touch were very soon to be swept away by modernizations led by the Chinese 
themselves after the departure of the Westerners—a topic rich with potential for further 
investigation. Let it suffice to note that in the Aili Garden case, the Zhang family tombs were 
removed only in 1954 to make way for the construction of the Shanghai Exhibition Centre. 
The charitable cemeteries and mortuaries in the former German Concession in Tianjin, 
carefully preserved by Li Hongzhang, have now disappeared under the city’s skyscrapers. In 
the case of Siming Hall, twice a rallying point for Shanghai’s anti-foreign demonstration, 
only a wall and a gate still stand, having been designated a ‘Shanghai site of memory’. This 
memory belongs to a new nation—the People’s Republic of China founded in 1949, not the 
dead Ningbo natives who had rested there while waiting to be carried back to their 
hometowns for burial. China’s own modernization, including an anti-superstition campaign 
initiated in 1898, seems to have significantly weakened the power of the ancestors.82 The 
destruction of tombs has occurred on a much greater scale during the twenty-first century. In 
Henan province alone, two million tombs were destroyed in 2012, as the Communist 
government implemented a ‘tomb-flattering (ping fen)’ policy to free land for agriculture and 
mechanized farming. There were protests and petitions but their impact was limited, as the 
government was bent on development.83  
During the century and a half since the earliest recorded cry for the protection of tomb 
land was articulated in Shanghai, China as a country has come a long way, but how far would 
China go to destroy a key element of its traditional religious-political practices? Today, the 
destruction continues. In the second half of the nineteenth century, during the last few 
decades of the Qing, the dead were able to stand their ground against European colonial 
expansion, and the dead showed that they could empower the living. The power of ancestors 
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lay not in supernatural intervention but in the ardent desire of the living to act as their 
protectors. 
